Touro Law Review
Volume 34
Number 4 Dedicated to Professor Ilene Barshay

Article 14

2018

The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma: Are Bone Marrow Donation
Decisions up to the Parent or the Child?
Christina Carone

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Health Law and
Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Carone, Christina (2018) "The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma: Are Bone Marrow Donation Decisions up to
the Parent or the Child?," Touro Law Review: Vol. 34: No. 4, Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Carone: The Minor Donor-Sibling Dilemma

THE MINOR DONOR-SIBLING DILEMMA:
ARE BONE MARROW DONATION DECISIONS UP TO THE
PARENT OR THE CHILD?
Christina Carone*
For a society which respects the rights of one
individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck
of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought
concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. . . .
–The Honorable Flaherty1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American Cancer Society predicts that in 2018, 174,250
people living in the United States will be diagnosed with a type of
blood cancer.2 This statistic signifies that approximately every three
minutes a person living in the United States is diagnosed with a serious

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; University of Florida,
B.S., in Psychology, 2014; SUNY Farmingdale State College, Certificate, in Health Science
for Health Professionals, 2015. I dedicate this Note to my brother, Rafaello, who was
diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia when he was two years old. I write this Note to
bring light to this issue because I was a minor donor-sibling bone marrow match and was
subjected to match testing when I was just ten years old. I was not prepared for this
responsibility prior to being tested, nor did I feel that I had the choice to say no. I would have
donated to Rafaello if he needed a transplant in a heartbeat; however, I was not adequately
prepared for the responsibility imposed on me, and I believe that minor donor-siblings should
be properly screened. I thank Associate Dean Deseriee Kennedy and Dean Myra Berman for
appreciated comments, helpful discussions and mentorship throughout the writing process.
And I thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her invaluable insight, support and guidance as this
Note would not have been possible without her.
1 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (Ct. Com. Pl., Allegheny Cty. 1978) (emphasis
added).
2 Facts and Statistics, LEUKEMIA & LYMPHOMA SOC’Y, http://www.lls.org/facts-andstatistics/facts-and-statistics-overview (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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blood disorder.3 Childhood blood cancers are one of the most common
types of cancers affecting children, adolescents and adults younger
than twenty years old.4 For example, leukemia, a cancer that prevents
blood-forming tissues from producing normal blood cells in bone
marrow,5 is the second leading cause of death among this age group,6
and children younger than five years old have the highest risk for
developing acute lymphoblastic leukemia.7
A child afflicted with a life-threatening illness such as
leukemia may need a bone marrow transplant.8 Bone marrow
transplants can be used as a treatment option; thus, parents are often
overjoyed when they discover a Human Leukocyte Antigen
(hereinafter “HLA”) matched sibling because finding a donor is a
critical component of the transplantation process.9 HLA-matching is
the most relevant factor when selecting a donor, and HLA-matched
siblings are usually preferred if available because they are the best
donors for the child in need of a transplant (“patient-recipient”).10
Biological siblings are usually tested first because there is an increased
likelihood that a biological sibling is genetically compatible with the
patient-recipient and may qualify as a suitable donor.11 If a matched
sibling is identified, that child is considered the best donor option.12 A
biological sibling13 has a 25% chance of being a complete HLA-match,
a 25% chance of being an HLA-non-match and a 50% chance of
3

Id.
Id.
5 Blood Cancers, AM. SOC’Y HEMATOLOGY, http://www.hematology.org/Patients/Cancers/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
6 Key
Statistics for Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/acute-lymphocytic-leukemia/about/key-statistics.html
(last
updated Jan. 4, 2018).
7 Facts and Statistics, supra note 2.
8 A bone marrow transplant is a type of allogeneic transplant in which bone marrow is the
source of the hematopoietic graft. CLINICAL MANUAL OF BLOOD AND BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION 3 (Syed A. Abutalib & Parameswaran Hari eds., 2017). Peripheral blood
and umbilical cord cells are other options available that use a different source of hematopoietic
grafts. Id. at 1.
9 Alternative donor options are pursued in the absence of an HLA-matched sibling. Id.
10 Id. at 2.
11 HLA Matching, BE THE MATCH, https://bethematch.org/patients-and-families/beforetransplant/find-a-donor/hla-matching/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
12 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1. It can be inferred that match testing ends once an
HLA-matched sibling is identified since that child is considered the best donor. CLINICAL
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.
13 A patient-recipient’s full biological sibling shares the same biological parents. CLINICAL
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.
4
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qualifying as an HLA-haploidentical-match.14 An HLA-matched
sibling makes the best donor and is favored because the child is readily
available for use, graft extraction, and possible future need.15
Moreover, using these children as donors avoids complications of graft
versus host disease.16 Desperate parents have resorted to the use of
genetic engineering techniques to conceive a child for the sole purpose
of finding a bone marrow match for their child in need.17 Children
known as savior siblings18 are designer babies designed and born
because their genetic makeup will be used to save a sibling’s life.19
As soon as a minor sibling is marked as a suitable donor for the
patient-recipient, that child is immediately labeled as a bone marrow
match and possible donor regardless of whether the child has
consented to participating in the process. Contrary to what one would
expect, these siblings do not have an option.20 This labeling
simultaneously changes the identity of a parent’s child from a minor
sibling—a child unaware of the responsibility that was just imposed on
her—into a minor donor-sibling, who will have her bone marrow
harvested for the benefit of the patient-recipient. Minor donor-siblings
play an integral role in the patient-recipient’s treatment plan, and this
unsolicited commitment immediately burdens the donor child. The
bone marrow transplantation process can require the minor donorsibling to miss school to attend medical appointments and receive
injections in preparation of the bone marrow harvest.21

14 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2. A haploidentical donor is a half-matched donor.
For example, a parent is a half-match to her child. HLA Matching, supra note 11.
15 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.
16 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.
17 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 2.
18 See Kristie L. Trifiolis, Savior Siblings: The Ethical Debate, SETON HALL. L. SCH.
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP, May 1, 2014, https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1432&context=student_
scholarship.
19 Id. at 2.
20 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8.
21 SickKids staff, Filgrastim, ABOUT KIDS HEALTH, http://www.aboutkidshealth.ca/En/
HealthAZ/Drugs/Pages/Filgrastim.aspx (last updated Feb. 28, 2018). If a patient-recipient is
fortunate enough to discover that a minor donor-sibling is a compatible bone marrow match,
the sibling may be required to endure a series of injections containing the medication
filgrastim, which can have serious side effects, in preparation for the donation procedure.
Filgrastim Injection, DRUGS.COM (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.drugs.com/cdi/filgrastiminjection.html; Filgrastim, CHEMOCARE, http://chemocare.com/chemotherapy/drug-info/
filgrastim.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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A donor’s cells can be collected in several ways; however,
bone marrow is the preferred graft source for children patientrecipients and common for pediatric transplants.22 Bone marrow is
harvested in the operating room and requires the minor donor-sibling
to be sedated under anesthesia.23 This surgical procedure is typically
one day and has the risks common to general anesthesia, bleeding,
pain, and surgical injury.24 The minor donor-sibling is put into a
medically induced coma absent any purpose that provides a direct
medical benefit to her.25 While the child is unconscious, a physician
injects a needle into the center of the child’s bone and extracts the
marrow.26 Transplant centers differ in the amount of bone marrow they
extract from the minor donor-sibling.27
The bone marrow transplantation process can have a significant
negative impact on a minor donor-sibling and may seriously affect that
child for the rest of her life.28 Minor donor-siblings often do not know
they have a choice in participating in the transplantation process and
feel pressured by their families to donate, despite the short-term and
long-term physical and emotional impact the minor donor-sibling may

22 See CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 10. Bone marrow is preferred in children with
hematologic diseases.
23 Bone Marrow Transplant, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/
003009.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
24 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 3.
25 Medically
Induced Coma vs. Sedation, AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS,
http://www.asahq.org/lifeline/anesthesia%20topics/medically%20induced%20coma%20and
%20sedation (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); Risks of Anesthesia in Children, U.S. ANESTHESIA
PARTNERS, https://www.usap.com/patients/pediatrics/risks-of-anesthesia-in-children (last
visited Oct. 30, 2018).
26 Bone Marrow Transplantation, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
/healthlibrary/conditions/hematology_and_blood_disorders/bone_marrow_transplantation_8
5,P00086 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). The medical risks known to be associated with
extracting bone marrow through aspiration include the risk of being sedated under anesthesia.
Id.
27 There is a recommended cell dose for collection, but no indication of a limit on the
amount extracted. CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 7. Transplant centers differ in the
approach used for deciding how much marrow to extract. CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8,
at 7.
28 See Taylor E. White et al., Family Strategies to Support Siblings of Pediatric
Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplant Patients, 139 PEDIATRICS 1 (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5260146/pdf/PEDS_20161057.pdf; see also
Harvesting Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0072612/ (last updated Dec. 30, 2016).
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suffer.29 The American Academy of Pediatrics has recognized that
medical professionals do not fully understand the long-term physical,
emotional and psychological effects donating bone marrow has on the
minor sibling.30 However, research has revealed that donor-siblings
with an active involvement in the patient-sibling’s treatment have
experienced feelings of anxiety, helplessness and guilt, which can have
long-term effects on sibling development.31 Donor-siblings may feel
isolated from their families after donating bone marrow and experience
intense stress as a result of possible post-transplant complications and
the possibility of the patient-recipient’s death.32 Further investigations
of these long-term effects and the influence of the transplantation
process on the minor donor-siblings’ development are necessary.33
This Note will analyze the underlying constitutional principles
respecting a parent’s and a child’s fundamental rights which relate to
consenting to match testing and donations. Part II of this Note will
provide background about the requisite medical information in relation
to bone marrow, the donation procedure, and the transplantation
process. Part III will address the legal arguments concerning a minor
donor-sibling’s right to consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical
testing and the transplantation process with respect to age and the
appointment of a donor advocate. This author will argue that a minor
donor-sibling has a constitutionally protected due process right under
the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse to submit to medical testing that
subjects the child to an invasive procedure or to have an independent
advocate represent her interests if she is not legally competent because
(1) a child has a property interest in her body and its products such as
bone marrow; (2) a child has a privacy right to be protected from bodily
intrusions; (3) a child has the procedural due process right to be heard
29

See Jane Elfer, To Investigate The Emotional Impact Of Sibling Bone Marrow Donation
133 (October 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of East London),
http://roar.uel.ac.uk/7137/1/Jane%20Elfer%20-%20Final%20Thesis%205th%20Nov%20
2017.pdf.
30 See Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 125 PEDIATRICS
392 (2010), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/125/2/392.full.pdf. The
AAP Ethics Committee addressed the need to conduct research monitoring donors and
recipients to advance the effectiveness of transplants. See id.
31 Id. at 395.
32 See Melissa A. Alderfer et al., The Social Functioning of Siblings of Children With
Cancer: A Multi-Informant Investigation, 40 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 309 (2015); see also
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30.
33 See G. Gail Gardner et al., Psychological Issues In Bone Marrow Transplantation, 60
PEDIATRICS 625 (1977), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/60/4/625.pdf.
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by a neutral court, or be represented by an independent advocate prior
to genetic compatibility testing; and (4) a child or the appropriate
representative must give complete informed consent prior to medical
testing. Part IV of this Note will address how other countries and
jurisdictions manage the care of a minor donor-sibling throughout the
bone marrow transplantation process. Part V will discuss this author’s
proposal for a program, and finally, Part VI will conclude by
addressing the critical need to protect a minor donor-sibling’s best
interests throughout the transplantation process.
II.

THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS

The bone marrow transplantation process is a complicated
medical process that can have an emotional, psychological, and
physical impact on a minor donor-sibling.34 Parents have the
recognized right to make healthcare decisions for their minor
children;35 however, a clear conflict of interest exists in cases involving
minor donor-siblings that will affect their judgment. Parents can
prioritize and make decisions concerning the best interests of their sick
child and minimize or neglect the effect of such decisions on the minor
donor-sibling throughout the transplantation process.
Bone marrow—a spongy tissue located inside bones—contains
hematopoietic stem cells (hereinafter “HSCs”).36 HSCs are unique
cells that have the extraordinary capability to differentiate into various
types of cells that are responsible for producing the body’s blood
components such as red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets.37
In a bone marrow transplant, a donor’s marrow is extracted and then

34

See W.L. Packman et al., Psychosocial Consequences of Bone Marrow Transplantation
in Donor and Non-Donor Siblings, 18 J. DEV. BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 244 (1997),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9276831; see also K.D. MacLeod et al., Pediatric
Sibling Donors of Successful and Unsuccessful Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT):
A Qualitative Study of Their Psychosocial Experience, 28 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 223 (2003),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12730279.
35 See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
36 NCI Dictionary of Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/
dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=693540 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). Hematopoietic cells,
also known as stem cells, are immature cells that are capable of developing into any type of
blood cell. Id. These cells are located in bone marrow. Id.
37 Blood & Marrow Transplantation for Children, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER
CTR., https://www.mskcc.org/pediatrics/cancer-care/treatments/cancer-treatments/
transplantation (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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transplanted into a patient to treat a disease.38 However, a bone
marrow transplant requires identifying a compatible donor whose
genes at least partially match the patient’s genes; hence, siblings often
serve as the best match candidates.39
Ideally, the donor’s bone marrow should match the genetic
make-up of the patient-recipient’s marrow as perfectly as possible.40
HLA typing is used to match bone marrow donors and patients and
thus determines whether a sibling is a suitable41 bone marrow donor
for the patient-recipient.42 A minor donor-sibling can donate if she is
considered a suitable match. A bone marrow transplant procedure,
also known as the bone marrow harvest, may be comprised of an
aspiration component, which requires that the minor donor-sibling be
sedated under anesthesia.43 During aspiration, a physician inserts a
long needle into the minor donor-sibling’s bone—typically a large
bone like the pelvic bone—to extract bone marrow which produces
blood cells.44 The donor can remain in the hospital from early morning
through late afternoon, or overnight for observation depending on the
child’s age, response to receiving anesthesia, and the physician’s
discretion.45 Among the common side effects of bone marrow
donation reported two days after the procedure are back or hip pain,
fatigue, throat pain, muscle pain, insomnia, headaches, dizziness, loss
of appetite, and nausea.46 After the bone marrow donation takes place,
a physician harvests the extracted HSCs from the donor’s marrow.47
One or two days later, the doctor transplants the bone marrow into the
patient-recipient’s body.48 However, a patient-recipient’s condition
38 Allogeneic
Stem
Cell
Transplant,
CANCER TREATMENT CTRS. AM.,
https://www.cancercenter.com/treatments/allogeneic-stem-cell-transplant/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2018).
39 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1.
40 CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1. The likelihood that the transplant will be a
successful increases with a closer match.
41 Allogeneic Stem Cell Transplant, supra note 38. A suitable donor is genetically similar
enough to qualify as a bone marrow donor.
42 HLA Matching, supra note 11.
43 Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26.
44 Steps
of
PBSC
or
Bone
Marrow
Donation,
BE THE MATCH,
https://bethematch.org/transplant-basics/how-marrow-donation-works/steps-of-bonemarrow-or-pbsc-donation/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). Although no stitches are involved, the
donor will suffer from bone punctures and skin punctures.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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may not improve even after a minor donor-sibling donates her marrow,
and the transplantation process is far from insignificant for her because
of the medical complications and subsequent mental health concerns
associated with the procedure.49
III.

LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING MINOR DONOR-SIBLINGS

Parents have the constitutional right to make healthcare
decisions for their children; however, the state can challenge a parent’s
authority when the intervention is necessary to protect the safety or
health of a child.50 The state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that intervening in the parent-child relationship is
necessary to ensure the health and safety of a child.51 Furthermore, the
expectation of such intervention and proposed treatment must greatly
outweigh the potential medical risks inherent for the procedure.52
Minor donation cases have been consistently decided on a fact-specific
basis and take into account the best interests of the parties involved
and the legal competence of the minor.53 Litigation may arise if a
minor donor-sibling has the recognized right to challenge a decision
made by a parent or a medical provider concerning her best interest.
Disagreements about this matter would create a state issue.54
A.

Preexisting Legal Standards That Have Been
Applied to Minor Donation Cases

Courts have employed various tests when deciding minor
donation cases. Courts have used the best interest test, which weighs
the gravity of illness, the physician’s evaluation, the child’s preference,

49

Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26. Such complications may arise resulting
from the following factors: the type of disease the recipient is being treated for; whether the
recipient had prior treatments of chemotherapy and/or radiation and the dosages of such
treatments; the recipient’s age, prognosis, and overall health and the closeness of the genic
match of the donor to the recipient. Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26. Possible
complications the patient-recipient may experience include anemia, internal bleeding, blood
clotting, organ damage, delayed growth in children, graft failure, graft-versus-host disease,
infections, and pain. Bone Marrow Transplantation, supra note 26.
50
Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
51 Id. at 1116.
52 Id. at 1113.
53 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
54 Although the states have the responsibility to protect children, issues concerning minor
donor-siblings should be addressed by Congress and will be discussed later in this Note.
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and the risks involved.55 Other courts have used the competing
interests test, which weighs competing rights and the substituted
judgment doctrine in which a court substitutes its judgment for the
minor’s to determine the child’s best interests.56 Generally, courts will
make two inquiries when using any of these tests. First, the court will
consider the effectiveness of the proposed treatment by assessing the
patient-recipient’s chance of survival with and without receiving the
care at issue.57 Second, the court will examine the nature of the
treatment and its risks by weighing the expected medical benefit to the
patient-recipient against the invasiveness and effect of the treatment
on the minor donor.58 Other courts have considered the mature minor
doctrine, which gives a minor who can show maturity the legal
authority to provide medical consent to a procedure.59 Courts utilize
these legal standards to rationalize subjecting a minor donor, not
legally capable of deciding for herself, to an invasive procedure that
confers no direct medical benefit on that child.60 Courts have further
supported minor donor decisions by anticipating the psychological
benefits that may stem from the sibling relationship to justify
proceeding with the transplant procedure.61
1.

The Substituted Judgment Doctrine

The substituted judgment doctrine allows a surrogate decisionmaker, such as a parent or legal guardian, to establish what decision an
incompetent person would make if that person were competent.62
Courts that apply the substituted judgment doctrine to minor donor
cases weigh the psychological benefits a minor donor will receive from
proceeding with a transplant or donation against the medical risks
associated with undergoing the procedure.63 Courts that use this
doctrine grant parents the authority to make decisions for their

55

Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1114.
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
57 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
58 Id. at 1330.
59
See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
60 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1330.
61 See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (reasoning that a fourteenyear-old would benefit psychologically from donating a kidney to a sibling).
62 Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
63 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1332.
56
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children.64 Arguably, the court should not apply this doctrine in minor
donation cases because an obvious conflict of interest exists. In these
cases, parents have a personal interest in saving their sick child and
will prioritize that child’s needs over the minor donor-sibling’s needs
and interests. Therefore, the court should not utilize the substituted
judgment doctrine because parents can be biased and their judgment
may not be based on what the minor donor would do, but their
judgment may be based on what they need for the patient-recipient.
2.

The Best Interest of the Child Standard

Family courts employ the best interest of the child standard
when making decisions that affect the care, custody, and well-being of
children.65 This standard is a subjective and discretionary test which
takes into account all circumstances that affect the child.66 Courts have
used this standard when addressing cases that involve savior siblings
and assess whether the psychological benefits of donating bone
marrow outweigh the risks associated with the procedure.67 The
medical definition of the best interest standard states that the standard
is an “ethical requirement that people who care for others will do so in
good faith, placing their assessment of that person’s best interests
above their own.”68 This standard is relevant to the care of
incompetent or dependent persons.69
In Hart v. Brown, a seven year-old girl needed a kidney
transplant.70 Her twin sister was a perfect candidate and identical
match for the procedure.71 The Superior Court of Connecticut held that
the parents had the right to provide medical consent for the minor
donor-sibling to undergo the procedure.72 The court found that parents
could consent to a kidney transplant on behalf of the donor child when
the transplant was necessary for survival, procedure risks to each child
64

See generally Hart, 289 A.2d at 386.
Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1331.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Best Interest Standard, FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.
com/best+interest+standard (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
69 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322-23.
70 Hart, 289 A.2d at 386. Bone marrow donations involve a less invasive procedure
compared to kidney donations; however, both require anesthesia.
71 Id. at 387.
72 Id.
65
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were negligible, the donor did not need to take immunosuppressive
drugs post-procedure, and each child’s prognosis for good health was
excellent.73 Furthermore, the court and each child’s guardian and
physician reviewed the parents’ motivations for moving forward with
the procedure.74 In this case, the minor donor-sibling wanted to donate
her kidney, and the court focused on the child’s intent.75 Moreover,
the court used the best interest standard and assessed the risks and
benefits of the kidney transplant before ruling and concluded that the
minor donor would be better off in a happy family than a distressed
one.76
In Curran v. Bosze,77 the Supreme Court of Illinois used the
best interest of the child standard to decide that three-and-a-half-yearold twins should not donate bone marrow to their half-brother because
the twins were not legally competent and did not yet possess personal
value systems.78 The court determined that parental consent was
insufficient to justify subjecting the minors to medical testing that
would determine match eligibility for the donation.79 The court
initially found that the substituted judgment doctrine failed to provide
conclusive evidence of the twins’ subjective intent regarding donation
because the twins’ morals, religious beliefs, and life goals could not be
determined.80 Consequently, the court used the best interests of the
child standard81 and addressed its three requirements.82 First, the
parent providing medical consent for the minor has knowledge of the
risks and benefits of the medical procedure.83 Second, the minor
receives emotional support from the parent providing medical consent
on her behalf.84 Third, the donor and the recipient currently share a
73

Id.
Id.
75 Hart, 289 A.2d at 387-88.
76 Id. at 389.
77 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
78 Id. at 1320. Minor donor-sibling cases are distinguishable from Curran because most of
these cases involve a full biological (shares both parents) sibling donor whereas Curran
applied to half-siblings. This author asserts that a greater conflict of interest exists when full
biological siblings are of concern compared to half-siblings because the latter have an
independent parent advocating for their best interests.
79
Id. at 1376-77.
80 Id. at 1324-25.
81 Id. at 1324.
82 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1324.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1343-44.
74
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close relationship.85 The court concluded that the twins should not
donate because they did not share a close relationship with their halfbrother with whom they did not interact.86
Curran remains the standard case for courts when addressing
minor donation issues. However, courts should not use the best
interests of the child standard to assess minor donor-sibling cases such
as Hart and Curran. Arguably, young children, such as the sevenyear-old minor donor-sibling in Hart, do not adequately understand the
nature or the demands that the bone marrow donation process
requires.87 Moreover, parents likely influence their children at young
ages, and in cases involving minor donor-siblings, parents may not act
in the donor child’s best interests when they prioritize the needs of their
dying child.
3.

The Age of Legal Medical Consent: The
Mature Minor Doctrine and Informed
Consent

In general, courts recognize individuals possessing the
requisite legal capacity as competent and therefore able to consent to
their medical care.88 Children are routinely presumed to be incapable89
of consenting to their medical treatment; thus, parents have the legal
authority to decide whether their minor children will receive medical
attention.90 Although a parent has the legal authority to provide
informed medical consent on behalf of a child regardless of what that
child wants, the law does not explicitly establish that a parent has a
protected fundamental right to consent for one child to undergo
medical testing that simultaneously subjects that child to an invasive
procedure that only may provide a physical benefit to another child.
Similarly, the law fails to make certain whether a minor donor-sibling
has a constitutionally protected right to consent to, or refuse, medical

85

Id. at 1345.
Id.
87 Hart, 289 A.2d at 386.
88
Alex Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment, 97 J.
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 415 (2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1079581/
pdf/0970415.pdf.
89 Incapable shares the same meaning as legally incompetent.
90 See Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Decision Making, U. WASH. SCH. MED.,
https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/parent.html (last modified Mar. 14, 2014).
86
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testing that subjects her to, an invasive procedure that extracts bodily
substances to be harvested for another’s benefit.
The same complex considerations concerning a child’s
voluntary participation in bone marrow donations are found in research
projects in which minors are research subjects.91 In both contexts,
issues of assent and parental permission arise.92 An independent
physician should determine whether a minor donor-sibling is capable
of assenting to the bone marrow transplant process.93 A minor donor
assents when she affirmatively agrees to participate in the transplant
process by actively demonstrating her willingness.94 A minor donor
fails to assent even when she does not object or resist or when she
simply complies with directions.95 An independent physician should
consider the minor donor’s age, maturity, psychological state of mind,
experience, and level of understanding before conducting bone
marrow match testing.96
Some jurisdictions apply the mature minor doctrine when
addressing issues concerning minors and medical consent. The mature
minor doctrine allows a minor to have the legal authority to provide
medical consent to a procedure if she can show that she is mature
enough to make a decision herself.97 This doctrine considers the
minor’s age and the circumstances surrounding the procedure as well

91 See Michelle Roth-Cline & Robert M. Nelson, Parental Permission and Child Assent in
Research on Children, 86 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 291 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC3767214/.
92 Id.
See Guidance and Procedures: Child Assent and Permission by Parents or
Guardians, UCLA OFF. HUMAN RES. PROTECTION PROGRAM, http://ora.research.ucla.edu/
OHRPP/Documents/Policy/9/ChildAssent_ParentPerm.pdf (last updated June 9, 2016). See
also A. D’Souza et al., Is ‘Informed Consent’ An ‘Understood Consent’ In Hematopoietic Cell
Transplantation?, 50 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT 10 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4320584/.
93 Consent and Assent, INSTITUTIONAL REV. BOARD, http://www.uaf.edu/irb/faqs/consentand-assent/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2015). Consent is defined as a voluntary agreement to an
act or proposal of another. See id. In the United States, the legal age of consent is 18 years
old. Id. Assent is the intentional endorsement of comprehended facts or an individual not
capable of providing legal consent showing agreement to participate in an activity. See id. In
minor donation cases, a child may be required to assent to the medical procedure. See id. The
consent of a parent or legal guardian and the assent of the subject may be required when a
child or an adult is not capable of providing consent. See Consent and Assent, supra.
94 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91.
95 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91.
96 See Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91.
97 The Mature Minor Doctrine, USLEGAL, https://healthcare.uslegal.com/treatment-ofminors/the-mature-minor-doctrine/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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as other factors and behavior that can prove maturity.98 A minority of
states has codified or adopted this doctrine.99 An Arkansas statute is
exemplary of the standard representing mature minor doctrine
requirements.100 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this
doctrine’s applicability to medical procedures, exclusive of
reproductive rights.101 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never
decided a case where the mature minor doctrine concerned medical
testing.102
In Bellotti v. Baird, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the applicability of the mature minor doctrine to abortion cases.103
Here, the State of Massachusetts mandated that unmarried, minor
women attain parental consent to obtain an abortion.104 In cases in
which the parents do not consent, the minor could petition the state
court to determine whether she is mature enough to decide to have an
abortion.105 The Supreme Court recognized that unemancipated
minors possessing the maturity to articulate a preference for medical
treatment may choose to obtain an abortion without the consent of a
parent.106 The Supreme Court noted that a state court may consider a
parent’s wishes, but if the court determines that the child is a mature
minor, the parent’s wishes do not control because a child is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution because she is a minor.107 State
courts should consider the mature minor doctrine when addressing
minor donor-sibling cases in a similar manner to their treatment of
reproductive and organ donation issues involving the requirement of
parental consent for a minor to receive a medical procedure. The
Supreme Court recognized in Bellotti that a mature minor has the right

98

Id.
Id. A few states such as, Arkansas and Nevada, have enacted the mature minor doctrine
into statute, whereas Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Illinois, Maine and Massachusetts, high courts
have adopted the doctrine as law. Id.
100 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602 (2018).
101 The Mature Minor Doctrine, supra note 97. The United States Supreme Court created a
constitutional zone for children to make their own decisions concerning their health in Bellotti
v. Baird. 428 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafter “Bellotti I”]. In that case, the mature minor doctrine
was used to justify a child making a medical decision and providing consent on behalf of
herself. Id. at 132. An analogous justification should apply to minor donor-sibling cases.
102
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 622 (1979) [hereinafter “Bellotti II”].
103 Id.
104 Id. at 643-44.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633.
99
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to decline or pursue medical treatment regardless of parental
consent.108 In addition, the Supreme Court in Bellotti noted the
uniqueness of the abortion decision because the procedure is
irreversible.109
Arguably, the decision to donate bone marrow deserves the
same special recognition. Deriving rights that the Supreme Court in
Bellotti established for a child’s decision to obtain an abortion is
appropriate because of the difficulty in locating a compatible match,
the donor cannot simply postpone donation because the matter is time
sensitive, and the invasive nature of the procedure which requires the
extraction and harvesting of a child’s bodily tissues.110 Moreover, the
decision to donate bone marrow is unique because the procedure is
voluntary, elective, and does not provide a medical benefit to the minor
donor-sibling.111
In the case In re E.G.,112 the Supreme Court of Illinois
determined that a mature minor has the right to refuse life-saving
medical treatment.113 The minor was a few months shy of turning
eighteen years-old.114 She was diagnosed with leukemia, and her
treatment necessitated the administration of blood transfusions or else
she would likely die within a few weeks.115 Her mother refused to
provide consent for this medical procedure because it conflicted with
her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.116 The minor also did not
want to receive any blood transfusions for religious reasons.117
Consequently, the state intervened and ordered a hearing to address

108

Id. at 643-46.
Id. at 646.
110 Id. at 645. An abortion involves a more invasive medical procedure as compared to a
bone marrow donation. Bellotti II also addressed a state statute regarding consent; however,
minor donor-sibling cases may involve a child too young to be considered a mature minor.
111 See W. Packman, Psychological Effects of Hematopoietic SCT on Pediatric Patients,
Siblings and Parents: A Review, 45 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1134 (2010),
http://www.nature.com/bmt/journal/v45/n7/full/bmt201074a.html; K.D. MacLeod et al.,
supra note 34; W.L. Packman, Psychosocial Impact of Pediatric BMT on Siblings, 24 BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 701 (1999), https://www.nature.com/articles/1701997.pdf.
112 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989).
113 Id. at 323. This case involved refusing medical treatment due to religious beliefs, and
the child’s and parent’s wishes were in alignment, which is distinguishable from some minor
donor-sibling cases.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
109
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whether a minor has the right to refuse critical medical treatment.118
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court appointed a legal guardian
who was given the authority to consent to the transfusions on the
minor’s behalf.119 The court maintained that this was in the child’s
best interest.120
The trial court addressed this matter further and held that the
state’s interests outweighed the minor’s interest in refusing life-saving
medical treatment.121 First, the court considered the doctor’s testimony
that he discussed the proposed course of treatment with the minor and
concluded that she understood the consequences of accepting or
rejecting blood transfusions.122 In the doctor’s opinion, the minor had
the maturity level of an eighteen to twenty-one year old and possessed
the competency to make an informed decision to refuse the
transfusions.123 Next, the court considered the minor’s testimony,
which she gave after regaining her strength due to receiving several
blood transfusions.124 She testified that she decided on her own to
refuse the medical treatment because of her religious convictions and
that she completely understood the nature of her cancer and the
consequences of refusing the transfusions.125 Lastly, she testified that
she requested sedation prior to the administration of the transfusions
because the guardian’s decision upset her.126 The court noted that the
minor was fully aware of the fatal repercussions absent treatment and
that she made her decision on an independent basis.127 Moreover, the
court recognized that in making its decision, it accounted for the
minor’s maturity and her and her parents’ religious beliefs and
desires.128 Nonetheless, the trial court maintained that the State had a
greater interest in protecting the child and the State’s interests
outweighed the interests of the child and her parents.129

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 327-28.
Id.
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 322-24.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 324-55.
Id. at 324.
Id.
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
Id.
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On appeal, the court extended the holding of the case In re
Estate of Brooks v. Brooks130 to mature minors. The court justified its
decision by referring to cases in which the United States Supreme
Court permitted mature minors to consent to abortions, absent parental
agreement or support through the exercise of the privacy rights.131 The
court found this extension to be inevitable, even though the United
States Supreme Court has not expanded this constitutional right of
minors beyond abortion cases.132 The court reversed the lower court’s
decision and held that mature minors can exercise the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment.133 The court rationalized its holding
using the State of Illinois’s Emancipation of Mature Minors Act.134
Courts will continue to have difficulty applying the mature
minor doctrine to these cases because many situations requiring
judicial intervention involve children under the age of ten years old
who are not fully developed and likely not mature enough to decide to
donate alone or understand the nature of the procedure. In addition,
precedent has established that a mature minor has the right to refuse
life-saving medical treatment; thus, in cases involving minor donorsiblings, a minor’s maturity should be assessed to determine whether
the child has the recognized right to refuse treatment which conveys
no direct medical benefit on her. A parent should be allowed to
consent on behalf of a mature minor donor-sibling if a court determines
that the parent’s interests align with the interests of the mature minor
donor-sibling as in situations involving Jehovah’s Witnesses who
refused to consent to medical procedures for their children because of
their religious beliefs.135

130 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
131 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 325. Other state courts have allowed teenagers approaching the legal age of
majority to consent who also shared their parents’ religious beliefs and agreed with their
parents’ decision to refuse medical care to provide consent to a medical procedure. In re E.G.,
549 N.E.2d at 325.
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A Child Has a Property Interest In Her Bone
Marrow

The body and its parts are sometimes treated as property and
are sometimes the subject of privacy rights.136 All definitions of
property encompass some type of ownership or legal right with respect
to an object or thing.137 A minor donor-sibling should have a
recognized property interest in her body and its products, such as bone
marrow.
Courts have struggled to determine whether human tissue is
personal property. In 2014, the Canadian Superior Court addressed
this issue in Estate of Piljak v. Abraham.138 Here, the court concluded
that excised liver tissue, which was collected for diagnostic purposes,
was no longer personal property of the plaintiff-patient once the tissue
was excised.139 The court maintained that a patient owns the biological
tissue prior to its exiting her body; however, a patient loses possession
and ownership rights over the tissue once it is excised.140 The court
first defined personal property as a “class of property dealing with
rights in a chattel or any movable or intangible thing that is subject to
ownership and not classified as real property.”141 Arguably, bone
marrow fits within such definition. The court in Piljak Estate
concluded that patients own the tissues in their bodies.142 The court
referred to an article published by the Canadian Medical Association
Journal, which discussed the rights associated with excised human
tissue and how to determine tissue ownership.143 The article
recognized that human tissue is excised either for the purposes of
diagnosis, medical treatment or research and explained that it “is
unquestionably true that patients own their tissue before it is
excised.”144 Accordingly, the court in Estate of Piljak held that the
136 Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human
Body?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371 (2007).
137 Estate of Piljak v. Abraham, 2014 CanLII 2893 (Can. Super. Ct. Ont.).
138 Id. at 2897.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 2898.
Carol C. Cheung et al., Defining Diagnostic Tissue in the Era of
Personalized Medicine, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 135 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3563886/pdf/1850135.pdf. This Note addresses who has rights to
access excised human tissue.
142 Estate of Piljak, 2014 CanLII at 2899.
143 Id. at 2898-99.
144 Cheung et al, supra note 141, at 137.
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tissue is subject to ownership rights and can be defined as “personal
property” because it is movable.145
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,146 the court
similarly addressed the question of whether excised human tissue is
personal property.147 The court held that cells are no longer the
property of a patient once they leave the human body.148 However,
Justice Broussard’s dissenting opinion stated:
[T]he majority opinion rests its holding, that a
conversion action cannot be maintained, largely on the
proposition that a patient generally possesses no right
in a body part that has already been removed from his
body. Here, however, plaintiff has alleged that
defendants interfered with his legal rights before his
body part was removed. Although a patient may not
retain any legal interest in a body part after its removal
when he has properly consented to its removal and use
for scientific purposes, it is clear under California law
that before a body part is removed it is the patient,
rather than his doctor or hospital, who possesses the
right to determine the use to which the body part will
be put after removal.149
Justice Broussard’s dissent properly recognized that an individual has
a property interest in her body and its products.150 As such, a child
arguably has ownership rights in her bone marrow.

145

Estate of Piljak, 2014 CanLII at 2897.
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). This case involved an individual’s rights over her excised
tissues which is distinguishable from marrow cases in which rights concern tissue inside the
body. See generally id. See also Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275
(Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Kievernagel v. Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Ct. App.
2008) (recognizing that gametic material is a unique type of property not governed by the
general laws relating to gifts or personal property or their transfer).
147 Moore, 793 P.2d at 498.
148 Id. at 498-99.
149 Id. at 151 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
150 Id.
146
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A Child Has a Privacy Right That Extends to the
Right to Bodily Integrity and Personal Autonomy
of her Body

The protection of the human body is safeguarded by various
legal doctrines including the constitutional right of privacy,151 the
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,152 and the common law right to refuse medical treatment.153 In
modern medical ethics, personal autonomy is considered to be of great
moral importance.154 Medical ethics requirements oblige healthcare
providers to respect a patient’s right to personal autonomy,155 and
providers consider this principle to be a significant factor in making
decisions about an individual’s health.156
Arguably, a minor donor should have a privacy right with
respect to her bone marrow. The court in Curran acknowledged that a
healthy child is rendered a victim when subjected to bodily intrusions
that convey no direct medical benefit to that child.157 More
specifically, it can be deduced from judicial decisions that taking the
bone marrow from a child constitutes a personal bodily invasion and
is a violation of a child’s constitutional rights.158 Courts have routinely
refused to force one person to undergo a medical procedure for the
purpose of benefiting another, even in circumstances where a blood
relationship is shared, the risk to one individual is perceived to be
minimal and the benefit to the other individual possibly will be great.159
Moreover, it could be argued that minor donor-siblings are victims
whose constitutional rights are being infringed by parents making
decisions in their best interest. These children are healthy; if they were
not, doctors would not sedate them and extract their bone marrow for
151

Rao, supra note 136.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
153 See id. at 777-79.
154 See Alireza Parsapoor et al., Autonomy of Children and Adolescents in Consent to
Treatment: Ethical, Jurisprudential and Legal Considerations, 24 IRANIAN J. PEDIATRICS 241
(2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4276576/pdf/IJPD-24-241.pdf.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157
Isabel Wilkerson, In Marrow Donor Lawsuit, Altruism Collides With Right to Protect
Child, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/30/us/in-marrowdonor-lawsuit-altruism-collides-with-right-to-protect-child.html.
158 See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Ct. Com. Pl., Allegheny Cty. 1978).
158 Id. at 90.
159 Id.
152
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harvesting. Further, the extraction of bone marrow from the inside of
a child’s bone constitutes a bodily intrusion because it requires the use
of a large needle that is thick enough to puncture the strong surface of
the bone. This bodily intrusion of a healthy child without the child’s
consent violates the child’s constitutional rights.
In McFall v. Shimp, the plaintiff asked a court compel his first
cousin, the only compatible bone marrow match, to submit to a
transplant procedure and donate his bone marrow.160 Judge Flaherty
of the Pennsylvania court addressed whether society can infringe upon
an individual’s absolute right to her bodily security to save another’s
life when the infringement is the only means available.161 First, Judge
Flaherty discussed a moral argument embedded in common law that
has maintained that individuals do not have a legal obligation to give
aid or take action to save or rescue another.162 Next, Judge Flaherty
asserted that the government exists to protect individuals from being
invaded and hurt by another.163 Judge Flaherty then stated:
[T]o submit to an intrusion of his body would change
the very concept and principle upon which our society
was founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the
individual, and would impose a rule which would know
no limits, and one could not imagine where the line
would be drawn. . . . For a society which respects the
rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it
sustenance for another member, is revolting to our
hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible
extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the
judicial mind.164
Judge Flaherty correctly reasoned that an individual cannot be
compelled to submit to a medical procedure that benefits another.
However, minor donor-siblings do not have the legal authority to
consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical testing or procedure, and
parents with an interest to save another child hold the authority to

160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 91.
Id. at 91-92.
McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 14

1130

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

decide for these children. These children need to be protected from
being invaded by another as Judge Flaherty stated.165
1.

Congress’s Spending Power

Congress can exercise its spending power to enact a statute for
a program that is funded through a federal grant and protects minor
donor-siblings through conditional spending.166 Although states have
the responsibility to protect children, Congress should address issues
concerning minor donor-siblings to achieve adequate protection for
these children. Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution
provides Congress with the authority to govern according to its
enumerated powers.167 However. the United States Constitution does
not explicitly authorize Congress to regulate minor donations.168
Consequently, Congress cannot compel the states to enact or
implement laws that protect minor donor-siblings.169 Nonetheless,
Congress can exercise its spending power to influence state law by
incentivizing states to comply with the enactment of a federal program,
funded through a grant, to protect minor donor-siblings.170 The federal
program must explicitly state its conditions and have some relationship
to the purpose of the spending program.171 States may opt to
participate and comply with the program’s requirements.172
Such legislation is critical to protect the minor who lacks the
legal capacity to consent to, or refuse to submit to, medical testing over
a parent’s decision in situations involving minor donor-siblings.
Consequently, desperate parents frenzied over one dying child
continue to hold the absolute legal authority to consent to medical
testing for another child while expecting to act in the minor donorsibling’s best interest. Although legal, ethical, and psychological
concerns have been expressed about minor sibling donations, few

165

Id.
U.S. CONST. art 1. § 8, cl. 1 (granting the power to issue and collect taxes “to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defense and General Welfare of the United States”).
167 See id.
168
See id.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See U.S. CONST. art 1. § 8, cl. 1.
172 See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103 (1987).
166
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cases have reached the courts because the legal management of minor
sibling donations remains undeveloped.
D.

The Liberty Interest of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”173 Upon birth, a child acquires all of the protections afforded by
the Fourteenth Amendment including the right of bodily autonomy
because a child is a person. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against government interference with specific
fundamental rights and liberty interests.174 Additionally, precedent has
established that the substantive due process right to bodily integrity is
encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.175 The Supreme Court has held that the right to bodily
integrity allows a woman to obtain an abortion, entitles an individual
to refuse medical treatment,176 and allows families to make decisions
concerning contraceptive use.177 Therefore, the substantive due
process right to bodily integrity should be extended to include
managing the care of minor donor-siblings, as these children should
have the recognized right to refuse unsolicited or non-beneficial
medical treatment.178

173

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993).
175 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 702.
176 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
177 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (involving a nine-year-old voluntarily
distributing leaflets); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving an Amish child
explicitly agreeing to home schooling); see also Washington, 521 U.S. at 702; Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 261.
178 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (stating that circumstances could never be
compelling enough to justify a massive intrusion into an individual’s body, like a Cesarean
section, contrary to the wishes of that person); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that courts have “consistently refused to force one person to
undergo medical procedures for the purpose of benefiting another person—even where the
two persons share a blood relationship, and even where the risk to the first person is perceived
to be minimal and the benefit to the second person may be great”).
174
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A Parent’s Fundamental Right

The Supreme Court has demonstrated in several contexts an
unwillingness to intervene in parental decisions.179
This is
demonstrated by a long history of precedent, which has unambiguously
established that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in raising a
child as she sees fit.180 In the context involving minor donor-siblings,
the relevant liberty interest at issue pertains to a parent’s interest in the
care, custody, and control of her child.181
Parents have the fundamental right to make decisions affecting
the care, custody, control and management of their children.182 This
fundamental right is reflected in Wisconsin v. Yoder,183 where the
United States Supreme Court stated that the “primary role of . . .
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.”184 Further, in Parham v.
J.R.,185 the Court stated that its “jurisprudence historically . . . reflected
Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children.”186 The Court also held in
Troxel v. Granville that a fit parent will act in the best interest of her
children.187 In that case, the Court explained that a parent is fit so long
as the parent adequately cares for her children.188 The State will not
intervene in the parent-child relationship or “into the private realm of
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children” if the parent
is fit.189 In light of this extensive precedent, it is clear that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment validates a parent’s
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
control and management of her children.190 Thus, it is accepted that
179

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 58.
181 Id. at 59.
182 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (noting that parents have the fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of their children).
183 Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 205.
184 Id. at 232.
185
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
186 Id. at 602.
187 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
188 Id. at 68.
189 Id.
190 Id.
180
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courts give considerable deference to parents and challenge their
decisions under limited circumstances.
However, the Supreme Court did not intend for the
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship to rationalize a
parent’s decision to prepare her child to undergo an elective surgical
procedure like donating bone marrow to a sibling. There are limits to
a parent’s authority to make decisions concerning the health and safety
of her child. The Court addressed this limitation to parental authority
in Prince v. Massachusetts.191 Here, a parent was convicted for
violating a Massachusetts child labor law because she allowed her
nine-year-old child to voluntarily distribute religious pamphlets on the
streets in the evening.192 The Court held that the state’s interest to
regulate or prohibit child labor outweighed a parent’s constitutional
right to bring up her children as she desires.193 The Supreme Court
recognized that the rights of parents are subject to limitations because
the state as parens patriae may intervene to protect a child’s wellbeing.194 The Court noted that “[p]arents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion.”195 Accordingly, parents
should not make martyrs out of minor donor-siblings by analogous
reasoning.
At present, parents can continue to make martyrs of their
children because siblings are likely the best bone marrow matches.
Parents should not be able to use the Fourteenth Amendment to justify
exposing a child to a match test that simultaneously subjects that child
to an invasive medical procedure and conveys no direct medical
advantage to the minor donor-sibling. The state should intervene in
the parent-child relationship and should be able to further question the
ability of a parent to make decisions involving minor donor-siblings,
even if the parent is fit, because a clear conflict of interest exists that
likely affects the parent’s judgment. In cases involving minor donorsiblings, courts should not give considerable deference to parents.

191 321 U.S. 158 (1944). While Prince concerns a parent violating a state labor law which
causes the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship, minor donor-sibling cases do not
involve this issue.
192 Id. at 159.
193 Id. at 160.
194 Id. at 163.
195 Id. at 170.
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The Legal Authority To Provide Informed
Medical Consent

A child or an appointed legal guardian, not a parent, should
have the legal authority to provide informed medical consent when a
transplant involving a sibling is considered. A child should be
appointed by an independent advocate to represent her interests in the
matter. Arguably, an explicit conflict of interest exists when a parent
decides whether to subject a minor donor-sibling to the bone marrow
transplantation process. Consequently, under these circumstances, it
should not be presumed that parents will act according to the best
interests of their children. Courts should not give considerable
deference to parents in these limited circumstances and should analyze
their decisions.
In Bellotti v. Baird,196 the Supreme Court balanced the interests
of minor women in making the decision to obtain an abortion with their
parents’ interests in having the constitutional right to raise their
children.197 Here, the Court recognized that a parent should not have
the absolute authority to decide nor the power to trump the decision of
a doctor and his patient.198 It could be argued that minor donor-siblings
should similarly be provided an alternative, such as having their
interests represented by an independent advocate or guardian, when
addressing whether the minor donor-siblings want to donate bone
marrow after being completely informed about the process. As
pregnant minors can prove to the court that they are mature enough to
decide to have an abortion, minor donor-siblings should have the same
chance to prove to the courts that they are mature enough to decide
whether to consent to donate bone marrow. If not capable, the court
may appoint a legal guardian or decide based on the minor donorsibling’s best interests, even over a parent’s objection.
The court in In re Grady199 recognized that it should be the
court’s judgment, in place of a parent’s good faith decision, that
substitutes for an incompetent child’s judgment.200 Here, the parents
of a mentally incompetent child asked the court to appoint a special

196

428 U.S. 132 (1976).
See generally id.
198 See generally id.
199 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981).
200 This case is distinguishable because it involves reproductive capabilities and the
incompetence at issue is due to a mental impairment and a medical condition.
197
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guardian to authorize and consent to a medical procedure to sterilize
their child.201 The court in Grady held that an appropriate court has
the power as parens patriae and must exercise such power to make the
final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given on
behalf of incompetent individual;202 a similar position should be taken
on behalf of minor donor-siblings. The court also concluded that an
independent guardian ad litem should be appointed when applying for
authorization to sterilize an incompetent person. The court maintained
that it cannot authorize the sterilization of such person unless
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in an
incompetent person’s best interests.203 The court noted that if a person
is legally incompetent in some matters, it does not follow that the
individual is incapable of deciding in other matters.204 For example, a
child who is fifteen-years-old may be legally incompetent because she
has not reached the age of majority; however, this does not mean she
is mentally incapable of deciding to donate bone marrow.
Arguably, minor donor-sibling cases would not involve taking
away a person’s reproductive ability or mental impairment condition
as in Grady. Furthermore, minor donor-sibling cases may not require
as invasive of a procedure like in Grady; however, such cases similarly
involve providing consent for an incompetent person to undergo a
medical procedure.205 The court in Grady held that the authorization
to sterilize an incompetent person cannot be given by a court unless
persuaded by clear and convincing proof that sterilization is in the
incompetent person’s best interests.206 For minor donor-sibling cases,
a court should similarly not authorize a minor sibling to participate in
the transplantation process unless persuaded by clear and convincing
evidence that donating is in that minor donor-sibling’s best interests.
The court also recognized the importance of appointing an
attorney for the child when an application is made for the authorization
of an invasive medical procedure such as to sterilize an allegedly
incompetent person.207 This case signifies that appointed guardians
must have full opportunity to meet with incompetent persons to
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 478-80.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 475.
Grady, 426 A.2d at 482-83.
Id. at 478-80.
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properly represent their interests.208 As a legal guardian was appointed
in Grady,209 an independent donor advocate should be provided to
minor donor-siblings when a parent provides informed consent on
behalf of a child not yet sufficiently mature to decide alone. Congress
should enact legislation that sets up a program to provide guidance in
assessing whether a child is capable of deciding to donate, or whether
a neutral court should hold a hearing to establish what is in the donor
child’s best interests, which ensures that the child’s due process liberty
interest is protected. A standard should require the court to appoint a
legal guardian or neutral advocate for the minor donor-sibling in which
the advocate can provide informed consent. Informed consent includes
disclosing the risks inherent in the procedure, the potential side effects
and the possible long-term effects to the minor donor-sibling prior to
submitting to any medical test.210 Moreover, such a standard would
safeguard the child’s interests prior to submitting to bone marrow
testing. Therefore, a minor donor-sibling should have a recognized
constitutionally protected due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to have a neutral court hold a hearing or have a legal
guardian represent her to determine what is in that child’s best interests
when parental conflict211 arises or ethical questions arise.
3.

Judicial Intervention and Parental Conflict

The state has a compelling interest as parens patriae to protect
the well-being of children who are unable to protect themselves.212
Judicial intervention is necessary when a parent’s decision to use one
child to benefit another conflicts, does not align with the minor
sibling’s or donor advocate’s wishes, or is contrary to a professional’s
recommendation about moving forward with the procedure. In such
circumstances, a neutral court should determine the best interests of a
minor donor-sibling, and the parent should bear the burden to prove
why subjecting the child to an invasive procedure is reasonable or in
that child’s best interest.213 Minor donor-sibling cases involve ethical
208

Id. at 482-83.
Id.
210
Id.
211 Parental conflict may arise when a parent’s decision does not align with the
recommendations of an ethics committee, a physician, a donor advocate or the desires of the
minor donor-sibling.
212 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
213 Id.
209
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considerations that produce legitimate conflicts of interest for a parent
because such conflicts of interest are likely to affect the parent’s
judgment when making a decision that affects two children and has
irreversible consequences. The fit parent presumption should not
apply in minor donor-sibling cases because parents will not make an
unbiased decision concerning the best interests of their children.
Tremendous conflict may arise in cases involving minor donorsiblings because of the many ethical and legal concerns surrounding
the interests of all relevant parties. Consequently, these concerns must
be assessed by balancing the interests of all four parties: the parents,
the patient-recipient’s medical team, the patient-recipient, and the
minor donor-sibling. The parents are in a difficult situation when
deciding whether to subject one child to a painful medical procedure
in the hope of saving another. This difficulty should not be minimized
as parents likely do not want to imagine that they may lose their child
to a life-threatening illness. The parents have an interest in saving their
dying child. This includes an interest in subjecting a minor sibling to
medical testing and in consenting to that minor’s bone marrow
donation to benefit their other child. Moreover, parents have the
responsibility to decide the best interest of each child and should
employ a cost-benefit analysis that minimizes the detriment to the
minor donor-sibling. However, parents’ judgment may be impaired
when making these decisions because a clear conflict of interest exists.
Overall, the patient’s medical team has an interest in effectively
treating the patient in their care. The physician has an interest in saving
his patient battling a disease and has a responsibility only to his patient.
The hospital has an ethical and legal responsibility to respect parents’
decisions concerning their minor children and has an interest in saving
the patient. Thus, the medical team has a primary interest in
recommending treatments that it believes would fully and successfully
treat their patient.
The patient-recipient has an interest in surviving and
undergoing a bone marrow transplant if a compatible match is
identified. The patient may put pressure on a sibling who is a
compatible match to donate bone marrow. On the other hand, the
minor donor-sibling has a self-interest in refusing to submit to a painful
medical procedure that requires anesthesia. The minor donor-sibling
may also have an interest in wanting to help her sibling to please her
parents. Arguably, the donor-sibling might feel pressured by her
parents, her sibling, and the patient’s medical team when deciding
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whether to donate bone marrow. Therefore, only a neutral and
independent third party, such as a guardian ad litem, can decide what
is in the best interest of the minor donor-sibling.214
In the case In re A.M.P.,215 the court agreed with the procedure
employed by the lower court before granting the parents’ petition for
authorization of electroconvulsive therapy for their sixteen-year-old
child.216 Here, the court held a hearing and determined by clear and
convincing evidence that the child was not a mature minor competent
to make a rational decision on his behalf.217 The court considered the
opinions from the treating psychiatrist and court-appointed medical
expert and provided the child with an opportunity to be heard with the
assistance of counsel and a guardian ad litem.218 The court looked to
a statute governing involuntary treatment of adults for guidance in
protecting the child’s best interests and her due process liberty
interests.219
In Parham v. J.R.,220 the Supreme Court held that a child’s
liberty and due process rights were violated when she was committed
to a mental institution, as desired by a parent, without independent
medical review.221 Here, the court noted that parents have broad rights
in raising their children, which includes medical decision-making,
regardless of what the child wants.222 However, the state has the right
to question a parent’s discretion when decisions put a child’s mental
or physical well-being at risk.223 Furthermore, the Court maintained
that parents should retain the roles of making substantial decisions that
affect their children; however, involuntary commitment constitutes a

214 A guardian ad litem should immediately be appointed to represent the donor-sibling in
minor donor-sibling cases requiring judicial intervention. The guardian’s recommendation to
the court should be based on what would actually be in the best interest of the donor-sibling
in light of all circumstances, even if the recommendation is contrary to what the child desires.
See the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 105 (1988), codified
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 5103, which requires states to appoint guardians ad litem for children
in abuse or neglect proceedings.
215 708 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
216 Id. at 1236. This case concerns a minor patient’s due process rights whereas minor
donor-sibling cases involve a sibling’s rights.
217 Id. at 1239-40.
218
Id.
219 Id.
220 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
221 Id. at 631.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 585.
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deprivation of liberty and invokes due process rights.224 In addition,
the Court in Parham stated that review by an independent medical
examiner must occur prior to commitment.225 The Court recognized
that review by the institution’s superintendent failed to qualify as
independent, whereas review by the institution’s staff physician
satisfied the due process requirement.226
The enactment of a statute for a program that establishes a
standard should similarly be used to review minor donor-sibling cases.
A court should hold a hearing if conflict arises about a donor’s best
interests, especially when the donor child is not considered to be
competent or a mature minor. Courts addressing this issue should
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the minor sibling
is a mature minor competent to make a rational decision on his behalf
as in A.M.P.227 In making this determination, courts should consider
the opinions from a medical expert, a donor advocate, and a neutral
physician. Additionally, courts should provide the donor-sibling with
an opportunity to be heard and appoint an independent guardian to
represent the child’s interests.
Although review by an employee of the medical facility was
determined to be neutral in Parham, in minor donor cases, review by
an employee or individual associated with the transplant center should
not be considered an independent review because such persons may
receive paychecks from that institution, which exacerbates the conflict
of interest issue. Furthermore, medical facilities have a financial
interest in performing the donation or transplant procedure. As the
Court in Parham reasoned that involuntary commitment invokes due
process, a parent’s ability to subject the child to medical testing that
could lead to an invasive medical procedure should also invoke due
process. In addition, the Court in Parham recognized that due process
does not require a full hearing by a fact-finder.228
States can create ethical committees that only review minor
donor-sibling cases which would satisfy due process. For example,
such committees would evaluate and independently assess a minor

224

Id. at 586.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 631.
226 Id. In minor donor-sibling cases, a transplant center physician should not qualify as
independent. Parham involved involuntary confinement and did not concern anesthesia as in
minor donor-sibling cases.
227 Id.
228 Id.
225
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donor-sibling’s physical, mental, and emotional health and consider
the recommendations of medical professionals, such as independent
physicians, social workers, and psychologists specializing in child
development. Such medical professionals would evaluate the overall
health of the child and give an opinion about the minor donor-sibling’s
mental, cognitive, emotional, and physical maturity. The committee
would review the professional reports and consider the minor’s age,
the parties’ interests, the prognosis and condition of the patientrecipient and the age and maturity of the minor donor-sibling when
deciding whether judicial intervention is appropriate. The committee
members could be chosen through an application process and, if
selected, be required to attend a training session that addresses legal,
ethical, and medical issues surrounding minor donor cases. Enacting
a system like this would protect minor donor-siblings’ interests.
Lastly, this process would consider the interests of the parents, the
minor donor-sibling, the recipient, and the medical institution.
IV.

COMPLEX ISSUES CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF
MINOR DONOR-SIBLINGS THROUGHOUT THE
TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS

Managing the care of a minor donor-sibling is complex. It is
reasonable to conclude that a minor donor-sibling is at a disadvantage
during the care management process because of divided loyalties,
pressures, and guilt within the family context.229 Thus, it is also
reasonable to presume that conflicts of interests arise that may
adversely affect the best interests of the minor donor-sibling.230
It is evident that pediatric patients suffering from lifethreatening illnesses and in need of bone marrow transplants
experience various psychological reactions throughout this process.231
Most minor donor-siblings are not given a real choice or are pressured,
if not forced, to undergo these donation procedures at such young ages
without giving meaningful consent. Congress and state governments
have not put mechanisms in place to protect these children. However,
229

Janelle Mills, Understanding the Position of the Savior Sibling: How Can We Save Lives
and Protect Savior Siblings? (Dec. 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Wake Forest University),
https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39113/Mills_wfu_0248M_10493.pdf
230 Id.
231 D. Hutt et al., Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donation: Psychological Perspectives of
Pediatric Sibling Donors and Their Parents, 50 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1337
(2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/bmt2015152.
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the transplantation process unduly burdens and challenges every
member of the patient-recipient’s family. Parents are likely in distress
when their child is dying, trying everything possible, including
conceiving a savior sibling, for the sole purpose of saving the other
child.232 In this difficult situation, parents are often relieved when
discovering that a sibling has been identified as a donor. However, the
transplantation procedure involves two children (the patient-child and
the donor-child), and each child’s best interest must be considered.
During this difficult time, parents can experience high levels of
emotional reactions that may interfere with their judgment because of
worry, apprehension of the loss of a child, and fear of relapse if the
transplant is not successful.
Minor donor-siblings also experience reactions to the
transplantation process. These include emotional issues, such as posttraumatic stress disorders, anxiety, and low self-esteem after donating
bone marrow to a sibling.233 In a study that explored the psychosocial
effects of bone marrow transplants, it was concluded that donorsiblings are more likely to develop new behavior problems compared
to non-donor-siblings.234
An additional study examined the
psychosocial effects that sibling donors experienced after an
unsuccessful transplant. In that study, sibling donors reported having
negative feelings including guilt.235 Moreover, a different study
assessed sibling perceptions concerning the bone marrow transplant
process, and siblings reported that they felt lonely, were not getting
attention from their parents, did not have a choice, and were not needed
for support.236 Lastly, in a study that analyzed siblings’ willingness to
donate, siblings recognized concerns about the process in which they
decide whether to donate, and a majority reported having no choice but
to agree to donate.237 This study revealed that approximately one-third
of sibling donors felt forced to donate.238 It cannot be presumed that a
parent will only subject a child to an invasive and painful procedure
when the health benefits exceed the risks of the donation. Minor
siblings must be protected throughout the transplantation process.
232

Mills, supra note 229.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30.
234
See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.
235 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34. The duration of experiencing these feelings is
not specified.
236 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.
237 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.
238 See K.D. MacLeod et al., supra note 34.
233
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Recommended Guidelines in the United States

At present, Congress has not codified a standard addressing
how to manage the care of a minor donor-sibling throughout the
transplantation process. The enactment of a federal law would provide
guidance to transplant centers and protect minor donor-siblings from
the many legal implications elicited from using a minor donor-sibling
for a transplant procedure. In the United States, transplant centers
follow different recommended guidelines published by ethics
committees and various organizations.
The American Academy of Pediatrics Bioethics Committee
(hereinafter “AAP Ethics Committee”)239 issued a policy statement
that addresses the ethical considerations related to minor donors, not
siblings, serving as stem cell donors.240
In analyzing these
considerations, the committee used the benefit-burden test from the
perspectives of the minor donor and the patient-recipient.241 The
statement addresses the following ethical concerns: (1) an assessment
of circumstances for when it is appropriate for a minor to serve as a
donor and participate in the transplant; (2) methods to minimize the
risks imposed on a minor donor; (3) the criteria involved in the
informed-consent process; and (4) the donor advocate’s role.242 The
AAP Ethics Committee ultimately concluded that minors can ethically
serve as stem cell donors when certain conditions of the recommended
criteria are satisfied.243
The AAP Ethics Committee examined the risks and benefits to
the minor donor, the recipient, and the family to determine whether it
is ethically permissible for a minor to donate.244 Congress should
provide guidance to transplant centers by delineating what a
substantial benefit could be in minor donor cases. For example, if the
donor shares a close relationship with the recipient-sibling and the
transplant would likely achieve an outcome of remission for the
recipient, this would confer a donor benefit of continuing to share a
close relationship because the patient may live after a donation.
Congress should also prescribe a mechanism for using the benefit239
240
241
242
243
244

Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 392.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 393.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 392.
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burden test in which the benefits of using the minor donor and
proceeding with the transplantation process are weighed against the
potential harm or risks associated with the procedure for each child.245
Additionally, the AAP Ethics Committee addressed the
psychosocial risks and benefits experienced by the minor donor.246
Minor donors do not receive any direct medical benefit from donating
to a sibling.247 The benefit of helping a sibling in need is referred to as
a psychosocial benefit.
Most importantly, children reported
experiencing distress in relation to their role as a donor.248 Many
pediatric donors believe that they did not have the option to say no to
serve as a marrow donor, report being poorly prepared for the
procedures, and describe feeling responsible for the recipient’s course
after the transplant.249 Data has signified that donors experienced
feelings of being inadequately prepared for what to expect postdonation.250 Lastly, donor-siblings, as well as non-donor-siblings,
have reported feeling neglected by their parents throughout this
process.251
The AAP Ethics Committee then recommended five
requirements in which a minor may serve as a donor.252 First, there are
no genetically compatible adult matches willing and available to
donate.253 Second, at the present, the minor donor-sibling and the
recipient-child share a close and strong personal relationship.254 Third,
the bone marrow donation will confer a reasonable benefit to the
recipient in need of a transplant.255 Fourth, the clinical, emotional, and
psychosocial risks to the donor are minimized and are reasonable in
relation to the benefits expected to accrue to the donor and to the

245

See Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at
392-93.
246 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398.
247 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 399.
248 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 395.
249 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 395.
250 See WI Sharma, The Experience and Preparation of Pediatric Sibling Bone Marrow
Donors, 27 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 89 (1998), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/957
9018 (last visited January 4, 2018).
251
See id.
252 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 39698.
253 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396.
254 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396.
255 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397.
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recipient.256 The fifth condition recommends that parental permission
and, when appropriate, child assent be obtained.257
The first condition supports screening both adult and child
family members in the initial donor search.258 However, national and
international registries exist that are comprised of thousands of adults
willing to donate and should be searched before subjecting a minor to
the complicated transplantation process. The rationale for the second
condition identifies that sharing a close relationship with the patientrecipient could increase the likelihood that the donor will experience
some psychological benefit. However, there is no guarantee that the
donor will receive any benefit. The third condition fails to define what
qualifies as some likelihood that the patient-recipient will benefit from
transplantation, and it does not provide examples of circumstances that
could meet this threshold for guidance. However, the statement
acknowledged the difficulty of determining the threshold for the
patient-recipient to justify proceeding with the donation procedure.
Delineating this threshold is challenging because the patientrecipient’s prognosis post-donation is uncertain. The fourth condition
states that the patient’s transplant team should help the parent consider
the risks and benefits of using a sibling to donate from the neutral
viewpoints of the recipient and of the donor.259 However, arguably,
the patient-recipient’s transplant team is biased because it may be
willing to proceed with the donation irrespective of the likelihood of
its success. Likewise, the parents might be unable to make a neutral
decision that does not favor the interests of the child needing a
donation. As for the fifth condition, this author disagrees with the AAP
Ethics Committee’s delineation of the donor advocate’s role. The
donor advocate’s primary obligation should only be considered to the
minor donor when the advocate represents the child’s best interests
throughout the transplantation process; donor advocates should not
have any obligation to the parents.
In the United Kingdom, legal scholars and physicians proposed
that our policy be modified to protect minor donor-siblings to satisfy
the legal requirements for application in the United Kingdom and other

256
257
258
259

Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 397.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 396.
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jurisdictions with comparable laws protecting minors.260 The United
Kingdom’s statement explains that there is no moral or legal basis to
violate a minor donor-sibling’s right to bodily integrity unless the
recipient sibling will die without the transplantation and no other
medically equivalent donors are available.261
Although tissue harvest serves the best interests of
recipient siblings, parents are also obliged to act in the
best interests of the donor[-]sibling in the UK. Tissue
harvest should proceed if and only if it serves the best
interests of both the donor and recipient. Parents should
be forbidden, and they are by UK law, to consent to
tissue harvest unless there are substantial benefits for
an incompetent minor that can outweigh the potential
harm. There is no basis to subject a minor to the medical
risks of tissue harvest if the recipient sibling can wait
without significant risks of complications until the
donor becomes Gillick competent. We also argue that
the Policy fails to take into account recent advances in
haematopoietic transplantation from haploidentical
donors or related tissue-matched donors.262
The United Kingdom’s statement properly recognized that a parent is
obligated to act in the best interests of the minor donor-sibling as well
as the patient-recipient child.263 Parents and doctors should ensure, if
the medical conditions of the sick sibling permit a search, that no other
sources of equally or similarly effective transplant are available before
subjecting a minor to the physical risks and short-term psychological
harm of donating.
The AAP Ethics Committee’s recommended policy fails to
protect a minor donor-sibling’s interest throughout the transplantation
process. In cases involving minor donor-siblings, the United Kingdom
correctly proposed that the first condition should be replaced with a
requirement in which the patient-recipient’s medical condition allows
260

See Tak Kwong Chan & George Lim Tipoe, The Policy Statement of The American
Academy of Pediatrics—Children As Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors—A Proposal of
Modifications for Application in the UK, 14 BMC MED. ETHICS 1 (2013). Foreigners have
commented on and critiqued the recommended guidelines used in the United States regarding
the care management of minor donor-siblings. See id.
261 Id. at 1.
262 Id.
263 See id.
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a search; no medically equivalent related adult or histocompatible
unrelated adult who is willing and able to donate exists prior to
subjecting minor siblings to medical testing.264 This author further
supports the United Kingdom’s proposal to replace the AAP’s third
condition with a requirement allowing an incompetent minor sibling to
be subjected to the donation process only if the patient-recipient would
likely die without transplantation prior to becoming Gillick
competent.265 However, the United Kingdom’s proposed modification
of the AAP’s fifth condition266 fails to consider the issues surrounding
parental decision-making and the clear conflicts of interest. The
United Kingdom identified that a parent must act in the best interests
of the minor donor when making medical decisions that affect both
children, not just the recipient; however, that expectation is not
realistic because parents want to help their child in need. The United
Kingdom’s statement appropriately recognizes that a parent’s choice
to use and harvest bone marrow tissue from one child to benefit another
reflects an emotive desire to help the recipient sibling.267 Moreover,
the statement recognizes that a donor-sibling may not necessarily
obtain any benefits in light of the risks of serious injuries arising from
bone marrow transplantation. It is this author’s position that satisfying
the five conditions provided in the AAP’s statement, alone, is not
sufficient to justify harvesting bone marrow from a minor donorsibling because the guidelines fail to sufficiently protect the interests
of a minor donor-sibling.
B.

The Judiciary’s Role in Protecting Minor DonorSiblings

The AAP Ethics Committee maintains that minor donations
should not require court review or approval and that judicial
intervention should be pursued as a last resort.268 The Committee
asserts that the primary role of the judicial review process is to ensure
an advocate for the incompetent potential donor; however, an
independent donor advocate should be appointed to the possible minor

264

Chan & Tipoe, supra note 260, at 1.
Id. at 2. See Richard Griffith, What is Gillick Competence?, 12 HUMAN VACCINES &
IMMUNOTHERAPIES 244 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4962726/.
266 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, 398.
267 Chan & Tipoe, supra note 260, at 5.
268 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400.
265
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donor as soon as match testing is discussed.269 The Committee
contends that an ethics consultation may be appropriate in situations
where there is a concern about a parent’s motives or what is in the
minor donor’s best interest.270 Requiring judicial intervention in all
minor donor-sibling scenarios would open a floodgate of litigation and
unduly burden the courts’ caseloads; however, in such situations
judicial intervention should be required.
The AAP Ethics Committee states that the role of the courts is
to ensure that an advocate is appointed for an incompetent potential
donor.271 Arguably, the law does not recognize a minor donor as
competent as parents have the authority to make medical decisions for
minor children. Next, with respect to appointing an independent donor
advocate, these advocates are not truly independent. Medical facilities
often appoint social workers who are employees to serve as
independent donor advocates. These facilities could be motivated
financially to perform a donation procedure. Thus, an employee of a
medical facility might be biased to act in favor of her employer because
the employer compensates her. Additionally, in situations where there
is a concern about a parent’s motives or what is in the minor donor’s
best interest, judicial intervention is essential; however, the Committee
states that a healthcare committee may be appropriate to review a case
with such a concern.272
V.

OTHER CARE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Other countries and jurisdictions have codified uniform
standards for managing the care of minor donor-siblings throughout
the bone marrow transplantation process. In Canada, the Oncology
Division of Pediatric Medicine Department published guidelines for
the performance of bone marrow aspirations in children.273 Prior to the
donation procedure, hospitals in Canada require that the minor donorsibling be assessed according to written policies and procedures.274
269

Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398-

99.
270

Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400.
Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 398.
272 Policy Statement—Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, supra note 30, at 400.
273 M. Campbell et al., How Young Is Too Young to Be a Living Donor?, 13 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1643 (2013).
274 Id. at 1645.
271
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The World Marrow Donor Association (hereinafter “WMDA”)
also published recommended guidelines for managing related donors,
not sibling donors, that some transplant centers implement.275 First,
WMDA recommends that counseling be available for each family
member prior to HLA testing.276 Counseling includes written
information inclusive of all aspects of the family donation procedure
and care management processes.277 Counseling should also include the
option for the donor to decide not to donate.278 However, if the donor
is not capable of making a meaningful decision or is not legally
competent to provide consent, an independent donor advocate should
determine if moving forward with the transplantation process is in the
child’s best interest. Next, transplant centers should establish
procedures to ensure that donors are appropriately counseled regarding
their right to refuse typing or donation because related donors may be
emotionally or physically unable or hesitant to donate while
simultaneously experiencing pressure from other family members.279
The donor should be appointed a donor advocate and be examined by
a physician not associated with the transplant center or involved in the
recipient’s care.280 The donor must maintain the right to disclose or
not disclose the communications with the advocate to interested parties
such as the recipient or relatives.281 Lastly, the WMDA recommends
establishing procedures which evaluate the clinical risk to the donor
and address the recording of adverse events and long-term follow ups
for related donors.282
The WMDA properly recognized that it is important for an
independent physician who understands donors’ rights to examine the
potential minor donor-sibling prior to match testing. Some transplant
centers substitute a donor advocate or independent physician for a
transplant team member; however, the donor advocate should be a
person who is not a member of the transplant team, is not involved
with the recipient’s care, is educated about the risks and side effects of
the transplant procedure, can perceive any coercion during the
275 S.M. van Walraven et al., Family Donor Care Management: Principles and
Recommendations, 45 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 1269 (2010).
276 Id. at 1270.
277
Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270.
281 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270.
282 Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273.
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independent donor assessment, and can represent the donor in an
unbiased manner.283
This author endorses the WMDA’s
recommendation that potential donors be counseled prior to match
testing.284 If a counselor identifies any obvious reluctance to donate,
or any medical problems that would preclude donation, a deferral of
complete match testing is allowed.285 A counselor’s qualifications and
role are not delineated in the guidelines.
Additionally, the WMDA properly recommends that the family
member is provided the opportunity to decide whether to become a
donor.286 Minor donor-siblings do not have the anonymous choice
when deciding whether to become a donor, whereas volunteers have
the luxury to decide for themselves without feelings of coercion or the
knowledge that a sibling needs a match to survive. Generally, a minor
sibling is directly approached by a parent accompanied by a hospital
representative with the request for an HLA compatibility typing or
bone marrow match test for her sick sibling.287 At the time of this
request, the recipient is often identified as a candidate for a bone
marrow transplant.288 This author also maintains that a positive
balance should exist prior to proceeding with the process.289 This
balance is found by comparing the risks to the donor with the benefit
to the recipient, in addition to the benefit to the donor with the risks to
the patient, including the physical and emotional effects.290
VI.

PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL ACT TO PROTECT MINOR
DONOR-SIBLINGS

Under Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution,
Congress can use its spending power to incentivize states to comply
with its laws.291 States could adopt the program created by the statute
and accept its conditions,292 provided that such conditions, which could
provide an adequate minimum standard of protection, are explicitly
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292

Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270-71.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1270-71.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1273.
Walraven et al., supra note 275, at 1271-72.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Conditions are statutory requirements that must be met in order to receive funds.
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stated and have some relationship to the purpose of the act. Here, the
purpose of the act would be to protect minor donor-siblings, and states
would use the funds to achieve such purpose. The act should require
all transplant centers in the state to establish a specific ethics
committee to address minor donor-sibling cases to protect these
children’s interests and screen for possible issues requiring judicial
intervention.293
Legislation addressing how to handle this issue would benefit
the states, courts, healthcare facilities, and minor donor-siblings. For
example, the section of the legislation regarding ethics may state that
the purpose of the program is to enable states to develop and establish
ethical committees in all transplant centers managing minor donorsiblings to accomplish specific objectives. The section may include
the following objectives: (1) to protect minor donor-siblings and their
interests throughout the transplantation process; (2) to ensure minor
donor-siblings’ safety and prevent subjecting them to unnecessary
medical procedures and risks; (3) to address any and all conflicts of
interest; and (4) to provide support services such as counseling prior to
match testing and post-donation. Such an act would provide a
minimum degree of protection for all minor donor-siblings in the
United States, would provide guidance to transplant facilities
overseeing minor sibling donations, and would decrease future
litigation surrounding this issue. Congress should take into account
the nature of the proposed donation,294 the ages, maturity, and
psychological state of the children involved, and the substantial benefit
to the donor.
The act may prescribe requirements for pre-transplantation
data gathering in which the patient and possible donor-sibling are
evaluated. The evaluation can include taking detailed histories,
reviewing physical examinations, and performing imaging and
laboratory studies on the patient and minor sibling.295 The detailed
history should include the history of the underlying disease prior- and
post-treatment, history of infectious complications associated with the
procedure, family medical history, drug allergies, past medical
conditions, and social and psychological status.296 Laboratory studies
293

See Rosenthal, supra note 172.
Congress should consider the invasiveness of the donation procedure in conjunction with
all possible side effects, both long-term and short-term. See CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8.
295 CLINICAL M ANUAL, supra note 8, at 36.
296 CLINICAL M ANUAL, supra note 8, at 36.
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may include HLA-typing, blood typing, blood counts, and liver
function tests.297 A subsequent condition may require appointing an
independent donor advocate to siblings ten-years-old or younger prior
to match testing. Lastly, a condition may require checking national
and international bone marrow registries for an adult donor prior to
subjecting the minor sibling to HLA-testing.
Minor siblings acting as donors require special consideration
before beginning the care management process; therefore, this author
recommends the following proposals. An independent physician must
first examine the child to establish whether the minor donor-sibling is
capable of assenting or providing informed consent to donating. A
donor advocate with legal training or a court could make the
determination that a child is a mature minor. If the child is not capable
of assenting or providing informed consent, an independent donor
advocate, such as an attorney, for the child should be appointed to
protect the child’s interests. This is essential because the parent
providing consent on behalf of the minor donor-sibling likely has
conflicting feelings concerning the welfare of both the patient and the
donor. Next, it must be determined whether the possible donor-sibling
could and would endure the donation procedure, both physically and
mentally, prior to subjecting that sibling to match testing. In addition,
a per se rule could apply for children who are fifteen-years-old or older
in which they are presumed to be competent to consent to a medical
procedure alone.
States could use the grant funding to establish, train, and staff
ethical committees at transplant centers that only review minor donorsibling cases which would screen for ethical issues and concerns about
using a child as a donor for her sibling. For example, such a committee
would evaluate and independently assess a minor donor-sibling’s
physical, mental, and emotional health after medical professionals
examine the child.
The committee would consider the
recommendations of medical professionals, such as independent
physicians, social workers, and psychologists specializing in child
development. Such medical professionals would evaluate the overall
health of the child and give an opinion about a minor donor’s mental,
cognitive, emotional, and physical maturity. The committee would
review the professional reports and consider the minor’s age, the
parties’ interests, the prognosis and condition of the patient-recipient
297

CLINICAL MANUAL, supra note 8, at 36.
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and the maturity of the minor donor-sibling when deciding whether
judicial intervention is appropriate. The committee members could be
chosen through an application process and, if selected, be required to
attend a training session that addresses legal, ethical, and medical
issues surrounding minor donor cases. Lastly, this process would
consider the interests of the parents, the minor donor-sibling, the
recipient, and the medical institution.
This author recognizes that using children as donors involves
the same complex considerations relating to voluntary participation
and using children in research.298 In both contexts, issues of assent,
consent, and parental permission arise.299 For minor donor-siblings
involving children whose capacity to understand resembles that of
adults, the initial inquiry to determine whether the child is capable of
assenting or advocating for herself should be assessed. Congress may
refer to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development and Kohlberg’s
theory of moral development when addressing the maturity of a minor
respecting age.300 This mechanism would assist courts in determining
the maturity of a child when making decisions concerning a minor
donor-sibling’s interests and what the child wants to do.
In addition, Congress could categorize minors according to an
established age range based on known scientific information about the
cognitive and moral development of children.301 For example,
Congress may recommend that children who are fifteen years old or
older can decide to donate for themselves per se as long as the child is
not mentally incompetent due to a physical condition or disability.
This system will assist courts in determining the maturity of a child
when making decisions concerning a minor donor-sibling.
Additionally, Congress should establish factors the courts may
consider to determine what is in the best interest of the minor donorsibling and the patient-recipient. Concerning the minor donor-sibling,

See Research with Children FAQs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/children-research/index.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018). The Institutional Review Board considers the child’s age,
maturity, and psychological state when determining whether a child is capable of assent. See
id.
299
Roth-Cline & Nelson, supra note 91.
300 Hing Keung Ma, The Moral Development of the Child: An Integrated Model, 1
FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 57 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC38
60007/.
301 See Kohlberg’s Theory and Piaget’s Theory, PSYCHOL. NOTES HQ (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/kohlbergstheory/.
298
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factors may include pre-operation requirements, associated risks or
complications of donating, absence from school, requirements to take
medication post-donation and pre-donation, and the invasiveness of
the operation. Concerning the patient-recipient, factors may include
the prognosis post-procedure, the associated medical risks, and the
quality of life post-donation.
Congress should further delineate, based on age, a way that
state courts or ethics committees can assess what the child wants and
whether the child is being pressured into donating. Each child’s
development will vary; thus, courts must assess each minor donorsibling case on an individual and fact-specific basis. Congress should
enact a statute for a program that would be funded by a grant in which
states can adopt and implement the program to protect minor donorsiblings’ interests and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.
Managing minor donor-siblings should be addressed by Congress and
not state legislatures because the adoption of such a program
contributes to maintaining a uniform standard that provides minimum
protection for these children throughout the transplantation process.
However, if the child is not a mature minor, then whether the
minor donor is capable of assenting to the bone marrow donation
should be assessed. A minor donor assents when the child
affirmatively agrees to participate in the transplant process by actively
demonstrating her willingness instead of just following directions to
participate.302 Failure to object, not resisting, or just complying with
directions should not be construed as assent. The minor donor’s age,
maturity, psychological state of mind, experience, and level of
understanding should be taken into account. A minor who may be
mature enough to fully comprehend the nature of the transplant process
should be consulted about being tested and donating. Such a minor
should be provided with an accurate picture of what the experience of
donating bone marrow is likely to be. For example, such possible
minor donors should be provided with the information a doctor would
provide his patient when obtaining informed consent.303 The assent
procedure should reflect a reasonable effort to enable the child to
understand—to the degree they are capable—what their participation
in the donation process would involve. This determination should be
made for all minor donor-siblings prior to subjecting them to bone
302

Research with Children FAQs, supra note 298.
See Informed Consent, AMA, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/informedconsent (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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marrow match testing. After a minor sibling donates, the child should
participate in a routine psychological evaluation and follow up process
involving counseling of the donor.
Although parents have the recognized right to make healthcare
decisions for their minor children, a strong argument can be made that
a clear conflict of interest exists that will affect their judgment in cases
involving minor donor-siblings. Parents might prioritize and make
decisions according to what is in the best interest of their sick child,
and they might minimize and neglect how such decisions affect the
minor donor-sibling throughout the transplantation process. As such,
Congress should establish factors to be considered in determining what
is in the best interests of the minor donor-sibling and the patient
recipient.
Congress should also prescribe a mechanism that compares the
benefits of proceeding with the transplantation against the potential
harm or risks associated with the procedure for each child. Lastly,
Congress should specifically delineate what constitutes a substantial
benefit in minor donor cases.304 To help, a neutral donor advocate
should be appointed and have the right to consent, or refuse consent,
to bone marrow match testing on behalf of a possible minor donorsibling regardless of what a parent believes is in the best interests of
the donor-sibling because a clear conflict of interest exists which can
inherently impair the parent’s judgment.
A donor advocate should be appointed for all minors who are
being considered as bone marrow donors prior to match testing. The
independent donor advocate should determine what the child wants
and determine whether the child is being pressured to donate given the
totality of circumstances. The donor advocate’s primary role is to
represent the potential minor donor-sibling’s interests and well-being
throughout the transplant process. Such an advocate should be
appointed prior to genetic compatibility testing to ensure that the child
fully understands what the procedure entails prior to deciding whether
submitting to testing is in the minor donor-sibling’s best interest.
Donor advocates who become alerted to or concerned about the
interests of the minor donor-sibling should seek judicial intervention
to delay or prevent the donation.

304 For example, if the donor shares a close relationship with the patient-sibling and there is
a strong likelihood that a transplant would place the patient-sibling in remission, then the donor
would enjoy the benefit of continuing to share a close relationship with the patient-sibling.
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Under circumstances that warrant concern,305 a judicial bypass
procedure such as a conference before a judge should occur within a
reasonable time to address the minor’s interests, to determine whether
an attorney for the child should be appointed and whether parental
authority to consent on behalf of the child should be waived. Lastly,
it should be noted that each child’s development306 will vary, and cases
should be determined on an individual and fact-specific basis.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Hematopoietic cell transplants that use bone marrow as the
graft source are not only a potentially life-saving treatment, but they
are also a high-risk medical procedure.307 Minor donor-siblings must
be thoroughly evaluated prior to match testing and the extraction
procedure, and they must be monitored post-transplant.308 In addition,
parents are torn between forcing their healthy child to provide bone
marrow to their other child and doing what is in the best interests of
the both children; both options are at odds with one another. However,
the current legal scheme is deficient and needs extensive reform.
Therefore, Congress should enact a statute that protects minor donorsiblings’ interests throughout the transplantation process in the United
States. States may enact laws that provide additional protections to
these children. These protections will help to eliminate some of the
conflicts of interest present in the current system in the United States.

305 For example, an ethics committee member may express concern about a minor donorsibling.
306 Hing Keung Ma, supra note 301.
307 CLINICAL M ANUAL, supra note 8.
308 CLINICAL M ANUAL, supra note 8.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

47

